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An Interview with Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov

Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov was the former First Deputy Director of Biopreparat from 1988 to 1992. Biopreparat was the Soviet Union's biological weapons program. Alibekov defected from the Soviet Union and moved to Washington, DC in 1992.

During the process of production in the Soviet Union's program, how many tons of biological warfare agents were storehoused?

The Soviet Union has two main directorates responsible for developing and manufacturing biological weapons. Biological weapons were stored at the Minister of Defense facilities. For example, [the] Kirov facility was responsible for storing Plague, about 20 tons of Plague. The Zagorsk facility (now it's Sergiev Posad) was responsible for storing smallpox biological weapons, about 20 tons as well. And the Ekaterinburg facility (at that time Sverdlovsk) was responsible for continuous manufacturing [of] anthrax biological weapons. The amount of this weapon produced was hundreds of tons.

What were the total amount of biological weapons agents storehoused?

Nobody calculated these weapons in such a way. The problem was that some weapons were stockpiled and some weapons were just prepared for stockpiling. The amount of weapons stored was dozens or even hundreds of tons. There were several facilities there that were considered mobilization capacities. They could manufacture biological weapons in case of getting a special order.

If you have the production facilities, the technology and the knowledge, do you need to storehouse biological weaponry? How does it differ from nuclear or chemical weapons?

[It] depends on what kind of offensive biological concept one or another country has. If a given country wants to use biological weapons immediately in any war or military conflict, it would store biological weapons. Some countries can develop production techniques, can have mobilization capacities, and they can start manufacturing biological weapons in case of getting orders.

But in Russia, with production facilities still existing, would they have to stockpile weapons? If at some point in the future they wanted to use agents, how quickly could they produce the agents for use?

First of all, I don't believe that Russia has biological weapons stockpiled. These weapons were destroyed somewhere at the end of 80s. But if Russia does have a desire to start manufacturing biological weapons, it would take no more than two to three months to start this activity again.

Why would it be so short a period of time?

Russia has at least four military facilities that could be used for manufacturing biological weapons. These facilities have not been opened for any visits. These facilities could be considered top secret offensive facilities and they have the capability to manufacture biological weapons. In addition to these facilities, Russia continues [running] several facilities, so-called Biopreparat facilities. They were considered mobilization capacities. And we know that Russia stores all production documentation for manufacturing biological weapons. It wouldn't be a big problem to start this production activity if there is desire or if there is an order.

Which U.S. cities were targeted, as far as you know, back in the days when the Soviets had these weapons stockpiled?

Biological weapons were considered strategic weapons. The targets ... in the United States, [would be] large cities, large military bases--these type of facilities ... we can assume New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago--these type of cities.

What kind of agents were thought of as useful in this situation?

According to the Soviet Union's philosophy ... smallpox, plague and anthrax were considered strategic operational biological weapons. In future wars, if Marburg was finished, Marburg was to be used as a strategic weapon. But what was complete and ready for application were the smallpox biological weapons, plague biological weapons and anthrax biological weapons.

If, for instance, New York City had become a target, what would have been the expected mortality rates with the use of biological weaponry?

In this case, it's very easy to calculate. This work was done many years ago by an American scientist. According to this calculation, about 50 kilos of anthrax biological weapon that covers a territory with the population of about 500,000 people, would cause 100,000 deaths. I calculated, with the data we had in Sverdlovsk when the accident occurred and the amount of people dead was about 100 people, between 65-100 people. But the amount of anthrax agent released in the city of Sverdlovsk was no more than 100 grams. In this case, [with] the efficiency of these weapons, if a sufficient amount of this weapon was used, mortality rate would be hundred of thousands of people.

In New York City, with millions of people, what would one expect to see?

Depending on the type of weapons, depending on the mode of applying, but if we use the worst case scenario, probably half the population. If the entire territory of New York City was covered with sufficient amount of this weapon, the amount of people dead would be millions.

What biological agents were worked on at the time that you were involved with the program?

The completely finished and accomplished biological weapons were as follows: smallpox biological weapon, then plague biological weapon, anthrax biological weapon, Venezuelan equine encephalitis biological weapon, tularemia biological weapon, brucellosis biological weapon, and some others. In the 70s and beginning of 80s the Soviet Union started developing new biological weapons--Marburg infection biological weapon, Ebola infection biological weapon, Machupo infection, [or] Bolivian hemorrhagic biological weapon, and some others.

Why smallpox? How important was that considered to be as a biological weapon?

Yes, it's a good question, because smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980. And just immediately after, the Soviet Union government realized that nobody would have defense in the future against this agent, because it was declared [that] there was no necessity to vaccinate people any more. This weapon became one of the most important weapons, because the entire population of the Earth became absolutely vulnerable to this agent and to this weapon ... smallpox is very contagious. A relatively high mortality rate: 35-40%. And if the entire population of the Earth doesn't have immunity against this agent, possible consequences after applying these weapons would be horrible.

How could that even be considered as a weapon, with the reality of the epidemics that could occur and could get back to harm your own people?

First of all, when we are talking about strategic weapons, strategic weapons would never be used close to the territory of the country that is going to apply these weapons. Second, smallpox is very contagious. It's transmittable from person to person. Of course, the first effect would be from so-called primary aerosols, immediately after aerosolization. Then people who have been infected would start infecting other people. We know that smallpox is a very transmittable, contagious disease and it can cause epidemics or even pandemics. Smallpox is very efficient weapon because it could cause a lot of infected and dead people.

Was it assumed that before the weapon would be used, the Russian people would be vaccinated to protect them against blowback from people who traveled with it?

In my opinion, nobody cared what would happen to the Russians, because this weapon would be used just in case of, according to the Soviet Union's concept, a total war. And when we're talking about total war, of course, nobody would considered the several hundred thousands of dead Russians.

Why was the smallpox transferred from the Ivanovsky Institute in Moscow down to Vector in Koltsovo?

There was, according to the World Health Organization's decision, just two repositories: one of them in the city of Atlanta, CDC [Center for Disease Control], and another one in the city of Moscow, Ivanovsky Institute. But in the late 80s, the Soviet Union had a desire to relocate these stocks from Ivanovsky to Vector, to cover offensive biological works, because even at that time, officially Vector couldn't conduct any work with smallpox. But in reality, [they] did. At least, for that period of time, transferring smallpox stocks from Ivanovsky Institute to Vector could cover some of these works.

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