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Mar 2004 - Issue 3

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An Interview with Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov

Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov was the former First Deputy Director of Biopreparat from 1988 to 1992. Biopreparat was the Soviet Union's biological weapons program. Alibekov defected from the Soviet Union and moved to Washington, DC in 1992.

The main reason that it was transferred was so that it could be used in further research on biological weaponry?

Kanatjan Alibekov
“Inthe Soviet Union, thousands of people were involved developing an anthrax biological weapon. Here in the United States, may be two or three people were involved in developing protection against anthrax.”
– Kanatjan Alibekov

At least at that time. In the beginning of 90s, when I was the first deputy chief of Biopreparat, I had several visits to the minister of health, just asking to relocate the stocks from Ivanovsky Institute to the Vector. The main reason was to develop a cover story for conducting [official] biological work at the Vector facility.

Why was research done to genetically alter smallpox?

Why was it necessary to develop a 100-megaton bomb, when the United States and the Soviet Union had 10-, 20-, 50-megaton bombs? This was just a logic of developing weapons. You know? If you've got a weapon, your next step [is] to develop a more sophisticated weapon.

Smallpox is a fine weapon. But it could be more fine, just by adding some foreign genes. In this case ... I am asking the scientific community here in the United States, in the world, just watch such works very carefully, because in many cases, these works are conducted in ... I call them dark zones. We cannot say when we look at one another's work, what is the real purpose of this work. This could be used for developing new agents, for developing new weapons. This is a very sensitive area and situation. We need to be very careful and cautious.

What are dark zones?

I call the area [a dark zone] when the result obtained could be used for defensive purposes and could be used for offensive purposes. Let's analyze this situation: the genetic alteration of vaccinia [cowpox] virus. In many cases, you would never find any publication about genetic alteration of smallpox virus, because when we conduct the work with smallpox virus, it's very dangerous and you need to explain why you are genetically altering such virus. ... [however] smallpox virus (variola major) and vaccinia virus are very close genetically. When you conduct genetic engineering work with a vaccinia virus, the result of such a work would be applied to variola major. When we conduct this work, we cannot say what could be the real purpose or real result of this work. But some results obtained when you conduct work with vaccinia virus, could be applied for smallpox virus.

Was there ever a fear, during the time that you were there, that the U.S. was going to discover the program and therefore bring pressure against the Soviet government?

Somewhere in 1986-1987, we started feeling some pressure. We could understand what was the primary source for this pressure. We were asked by the government of the Soviet Union to analyze whether or not it would be possible to open some facilities [without] revealing the real purposes of these facilities. We conducted this work for several years. And a lot of scientists, a lot of leaders didn't believe it would be possible to open, because these facilities were clearly offensive facilities. But in 1989, we started feeling severe pressure from the United States and Great Britain. We were forced to open our facilities because in 1989, the United States and Great Britain realized that the Soviet Union had a very sophisticated and powerful offensive program. When these countries started pressuring the Soviet Union very hard, it was a kind of starting point for the destruction, for the dismantling of this program.

What do you think the ramifications are of the long-term program that did exist--the amount of material and the amount of knowledge that was created?

The problem now is [that] practically all the countries in the world understand that biological weapons are a very serious threat ... a lot of countries are trying to develop biological weapons, and for these countries, the Soviet Union was some kind of role model for developing these weapons, because the Soviet Union was able to develop one of the most powerful and sophisticated programs in the world. A lot of countries are following the Soviet Union's program. I strongly believe that some Asian countries, Arabic countries ... are trying to develop their own offensive program. In my opinion, for them, this country (I mean the Soviet Union) was some kind of example, some kind of role model for these programs' development.

Besides being a role model, what about the issue of actual information and/or samples from the stockpiles that existed? Should we also fear the transfer of knowledge and/or actual agents?

I'm very doubtful that the Russian government would sell any equipment (I mean sophisticated equipment), technologies, or strains to any other country. Thousands of scientists who were involved in developing biological weapons are now under-employed and unemployed, and this is the biggest threat. If you are under-employed and unemployed, in some cases, you will try to sell your knowledge, your expertise to people or to countries that are interested in such weapons.

In 1991, what were your impressions when you came and toured the U.S. facilities of what had once been an offensive program?

First of all, before I came, I strongly believed that this country [U.S.] had such a program. But when I came and I saw the abandoned facilities, and I knew that Soviet Union intelligence services didn't have any information regarding any other facilities but these ones. When I saw that everything was abandoned, of course, for me it was great that this country didn't have such a program any more.

When you went back to the Soviet Union, is that what you reported?

When I came back, and when I was asked to prepare my personal report about this program's existence, I said, "No" because I didn't believe that this country had such a program.

And then what happened?

... within two weeks I resigned commission and because I was a colonel of [Russian] army, in January of 1992, I resigned from the Russian army. And in February, I left all my scientific and administrative positions and quit.

You were asked to lie about what you saw?

I'll give you this example. General Yevstigneyev, who was in charge of this 15th Directorate, and a part of our visiting group formed by the 15th Directorate, said directly to his subordinates, "If you don't find any evidence that could be considered this country offensive program existence, you'll be fired."

Where is he today?

He was a major general. Now he's lieutenant general. He has received a promotion, and now he's in charge of first deputy chief of the Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Directorate of the Minister of Defense. All of the people who were responsible for research and developing and manufacturing such weapons, are now in that place. Former colonels became generals and they continue managing these facilities and enterprises.

The fact that the general, who told you to lie or else you would lose your job, is now in charge of the entire program in the Soviet Union--is that not somewhat worrisome?

That's what I say all the time. Just take a look at Russia ... the country itself and this program. The people who were in charge of this program continue working in this area. All the colonels who were in charge of these facilities became generals. All the documentation is stored at some places to manufacture biological weapons. All these facilities are still top secret facilities. And in my opinion, until Russia opens these facilities and reveals everything regarding this program, we cannot believe this country.

Why do you think they will not open these facilities?

Because they conduct work in this area. Until we see these facilities, we cannot say what kind of capability this country does have. I am saying (and maybe it would be very important to say directly to Russians): Open these facilities. I would be glad just to visit these facilities in a group of visitors from the United States and international community. And we'll be able to say what is the real activity of these facilities ... if we see these facilities inside, we can say whether or not they conduct offensive work, and what kind of offensive work.

How is a bio-agent created and turned into a weaponized dust form? How easy is it to create a weaponized biological agent?

It's a long technological process. If we are talking about sophisticated weapons, it's quite difficult. If we are talking about genetically altered agents, it's quite difficult. Regular ordinary terrorists wouldn't do this and cannot do this. But if we are talking about some primitive forms of biological weapons capable [of] kill[ing] thousands of people, [this is] not very difficult.

How would it be done?

A lot of ways. For each weapon, a technique to manufacture would be different. In many cases, we are talking about culture collections, just how to get this bacteria or viruses from culture collections. In many cases, unfortunately, [it is] not a necessity. A lot of agents can be isolated from nature. And if one or another person, one or another group has knowledge how to do this work, how to transform bacteria and viruses into weapons, even primitive weapons, they could do this without any significant difficulties.

Telling me just the basics, what do you have to do?

This group has to know several main points and techniques: how to isolate agent, how to cultivate it, how to concentrate, how to dry, how to mill, and how to aerosolize. If they know this, it wouldn't be a problem.

If a terrorist group were to get material (in the case of the table top exercise that was in March), a smallpox and Marburg virus, and they dispersed it on the border of the U.S. and Mexico, down in the El Paso area, what would you assume the effects would be from some operation like that?

In this case, I wouldn't assume any significant damage. The problem with biological weapons [is that] you need to have a very concentrated agent to cover large territories. But if terrorist groups uses biological agents, they would find more vulnerable targets, in my opinion. What kind of targets? Mostly in the cities--metro systems, administrative buildings, commercial buildings, stadiums, shopping malls. These type of places would be the most vulnerable to biological terrorist act.

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